Introduction
Economic conjecture notes that financial globalization affects the factor productivity of a country by promoting better corporate governance and signalling a higher quality of state governance (Henry, 2000) 1 . Pursuing financial globalization, i.e. encouraging optimal international portfolio allocations that integrates local with world capital markets may thus have a lasting effect on the improvement of investor protection standards (IPS) 2 . With respect to what should be the optimal portfolio allocations, finance theory suggests that investors should hold the world market portfolio to optimise their expected utilities (see Chan et al., 2005) . However, studies note that both domestic and foreign investors substantially deviate from holding optimal international portfolios (see, for example, Lau et al., 2010) . Such deviations are referred to as home and foreign biases in international portfolio allocations.
Home bias refers to the phenomenon in which domestic investors over-invest in the home market relative to the theoretical conjecture, thus leaving a significantly lower share of the country's investable assets to foreign investors. On the other hand, foreign bias indicates that foreign investors tend to either over or underweight foreign markets relative to implied benchmarks (see Cooper et al., 2015 for an excellent review). While substantial evidence exists on why home and foreign biases exist, much less is known about the implications of such biases. In this study we investigate whether the puzzle of home and foreign bias carries any consequences for the differing states of IPS observed across the world.
Empirical evidence concludes that the prevalence of home and foreign biases explains the degree of international integration/segmentation of the domestic equity markets vis-à-vis the world capital markets (see Janakiramanan, 1986; Lau et al., 2010) . This suggests that higher home bias reflects a lower degree of financial globalization, while higher foreign bias implies a higher degree of financial globalization (see Lau et al., 2010 for a theoretical analysis).
Consequently, greater home bias implies a relatively closed and less integrated economy with a lower presence of foreign investors. Alternatively, in a relatively open and financially integrated market economy, higher foreign bias signifies a greater presence of foreign investors. Since varying degrees of home and foreign biases reflect varying depths of foreign portfolio investments, studies document several channels through which foreign investors may influence corporate and state governance practices.
With respect to corporate governance Kang and Kim (2010) note that foreign investors particularly institutional investors play an influential role in domestic governance practices by employing various governance tactics. Such disciplinary methods may take the form of hostile takeover threats, proxy contests, expressing opposition to or attempting to amend anti-takeover provisions 3 , initiating efforts to seek representation on the target boards, threatening the replacement of top executives and demanding asset downsizing. Likewise, Boubakri et al. (2005) note that foreign ownership could lead to improvements in the post-privatization performance of newly privatized firms because foreign investors normally demand high information disclosure standards, inject funds into newly privatized firms and, for the sake of their reputation, maintain stern control of managers' action. Kho et al.'s (2009) theoretical framework argues that foreign investors, particularly those from countries with better investor protection institutions, become valuable inside monitors as the laws of their home countries restrict their ability to consume private benefits made by other insiders. On the empirical front, using data on China's split-share structure reform, Huang and Zhu (2015) show that involving foreign institutional investors in corporate governance practices can significantly lower the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholders in emerging markets.
With reference to the standard of state governance, economists remark that competition for foreign financial resources compels policymakers to reform the state and corporate governance practices 4 (see Errunza, 2001) . With respect to state governance, Stulz (2005) argues that financial globalization makes it difficult for the state itself to expropriate investors as it risks losing the much needed foreign investments if it does not heed the demands of foreign investors 5 . Similar sentiments are echoed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) who conjecture that competition for financial resources becomes stronger when foreign investors become involved in the domestic economy. As a result, the growing interest of foreign investors drives reform 6 in the domestic investor protection regulations (see Rajan and Zingales, 2000) . For example, responding to foreign investors' pressure, domestic regulatory bodies signal their intention to improve the quality of governance through the adoption of international accounting standards. Errunza (2001) also posits that with their increasing interest, foreign investors demand the formulation and observance of regulations, which compels corporates to disseminate timely and relevant information to the investor fraternity. Using data from emerging markets, Huang and Zhu (2015) show that the flow of foreign institutional investors help promote the marketbased principle of corporate governance, thus reducing the "twin agency" problem associated with state ruler's discretion. 4 For example, in 2007 Japan implemented the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, which amended or abolished many laws that regulated foreign securities firms and was intentionally based on the UK's Financial Services Authority's framework (Report by Herbert Smith, 2008 on Contemporary issues facing financial services institutions in Asia, http://documents.lexology.com/cd07ed3a-b7d3-4b63-ab50-bcffa0e01dc1.pdf) 5 TCI initiated legal action against the Indian government under the provisions of bilateral investment treaties between India and UK over the under-pricing of coal by Coal India Limited, in which TCI holds a 1% stake (see: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/tci-starts-legal-action-against-indian-govt-under-ukcyprus-treaties-112032900095_1.html). Second, consistent with the findings reported by Chan et al. (2005) , our results show that the developed markets generally exhibit a lower level of home bias compared to emerging markets. We also find that most developed countries experience stronger positive foreign bias, 7 See Cooper et al. (2015) for an extensive survey on the causes of home and foreign biases.
i.e. these countries are preferred by international investors compared to the emerging markets.
However, we further contribute to this strand of literature by providing new evidence of biases in the cross-country asset allocations made by sophisticated global fund managers who are ideally expected to achieve optimal global diversification. This evidence uncovers that the manifestation of investment biases is not only observed in the aggregate and macro data, which may include singly country or regional funds, but also in the investment behaviour of the most sophisticated global fund managers.
Our study adds to two different strands of literature. First, and as noted above, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of suboptimal international portfolio allocation on the quality of IPS. Our study is remotely related to Lau et al. (2010) who also demonstrate the implications of home and foreign biases. However, their focus is on the level of cost of capital, whereas our study examines the influence of home and foreign biases on the quality of IPS. Few studies that investigate the determinants of investor protection are focused on the role of economic openness, not on financial openness. For example, Islam and Montenegro (2002) demonstrate that trade openness is positively associated with institutional quality but they do not investigate the effect of financial openness. Similarly, Busse and Gröning (2009) also demonstrate the importance of trade liberalization on good governance practices but, again, do not account for financial openness.
Second, the results of our study also add to the growing debate which states that the impact of international diversification and consequent risk sharing benefits should not be limited to cost of capital and growth responses (Kose et al., 2010) . Rather, the beneficial results should be examined through the influence of financial globalization on factor productivity, such as improvement of micro and macro institutional quality, including corporate and state governance.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results, and section 4 concludes the paper.
Data
In this section we first describe the four different country-level IPS measures, followed by the description of home and foreign bias measures (i.e. measures of suboptimal international diversification). Finally, following the literature we briefly discuss the control variables included in our analyses.
Proxies of Investor Protection Standards
In their seminal paper La Porta et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of institutions and the legal environment in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. They note that the quality of country level IPS is highly correlated with the protection offered to corporate investors, particularly to minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) define good governance as one that protects property rights of economic agents, keeps regulations light, is clean, and democratic. Good governance relates to safeguarding the property rights by formulating effective law, facilitating a conducive environment of contract enforcement and refraining from expropriation. As such, our study employs four measures of IPS capturing the quality and practice of the different dimensions of firm and country level investor protection rights.
Firm-level Corporate Governance Measure
The first investor protection measure we use is the composite index representing the firm-level corporate governance (Firm_Gov) . We obtain the data from two different sources.
For the developed markets we secure the dataset from Aggarwal et al. (2011 Aggarwal et al. (2011, page. 157) for details of the number of firms used for each country.
Investment Profile Index
The second measure of IPS we incorporate is referred as investment profile (Inv_file) index. This country level rating index is obtained from Political Risk Services ' (PRS) International Country Risk Guide reflecting governments' attitude towards inward foreign investment (see Bekaert et al., 2007 values demonstrating greater powers accorded to shareholders to challenge the related-party transactions made by the insiders. It specifically reveals the extent to which shareholders have direct access to a company's internal documents and make use of the government inspectors without filing suits in court. It further reflects the degree to which documents and information are available to the plaintiff shareholder in the case of a legal trial. For further details on the methodology used in the construction of the SIPI_WBDB index and its components and subcomponents, refer to Djankov et al. (2008) . For ease of comparison, we normalize the SIPI_WBDB factor on a scale of 0-100.
Country-level Institutional Measure of IPS
Finally, the fourth alternative measure of IPS we use is a country level institutional quality indicator (ALT_WBGI) constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) detailed methodology on the construction, refer to Kaufmann et al. (2010) . The WGI dataset is widely used in existing studies, primarily in investigating cross-country governance and the association between governance and growth (see, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003) .
Measures of Home and Foreign Biases
We employ two datasets to measure home and foreign biases exhibited by equity 13 For detailed descriptions of this dataset see Bekaert and Wang (2010) .
14 Given the granularity of the EPFR database, it has been employed by several studies (see Gelos and Wei, 2005; and Jotikasthira et al., 2012) . However, as the funds are domiciled only in 13 countries, we are unable to construct efficient measures of home bias due to the smaller number of observations for our empirical analysis.
US$120 billion and is domiciled across nine countries. As these are global funds with the sole purpose of global allocations, we expect the foreign bias to be lower compared to the CPIS aggregate data which include various types of funds (undisclosed) and different investment styles.
Finally, for the benchmark we employ the total country level market capitalization figures of S&P/IFC from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank Further, we also use the MSCI investible market capitalization to construct the free float benchmark.
We describe the measures of home and foreign biases in the sub-sections immediately below.
Equity Home Bias
Equity home bias (EHB) refers to the degree to which domestic investors over-allocate their investable funds to the domestic equity market relative to the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) benchmark. Following Chan et al. (2005) we define equity home bias as in equation (1).
In equation (1) (defined in equation 2) represents domestic investors' weightings in the domestic market capitalization of country j at time t.
ℎ is the stockholdings of investors in their home market j and is the total portfolio holdings (domestic and foreign) of all investors domiciled in country j at time t. CPIS reports the bilateral foreign equity portfolio holdings, with no investments in the domestic market, for each host country j. Following Fidora et al. (2007) we construct domestic holdings (ℎ ) and total portfolio holdings of domestic investors ( ) as in equation (3).
In equation (3) is the domestic market capitalization of country j at time t and , ≠ is the equity holding in country j by foreign investors domiciled in country . Thus, is defined as in equation (4) is foreign securities (i) held by investors domiciled in country j at time t. * is the ICAPM world benchmark allocation for country j for the time t, which is the same for all investors in all countries and is defined in equation (5).
A zero value of in Equation (1) indicates that portfolio investors do not manifest any bias towards their home market relative to the ICAPM benchmark, while a positive value indicates the presence of home bias. As the is constructed using CPIS data, we denote it by CPIS_HB in further analysis.
Equity Foreign Bias
Relative to the suggestion of ICAPM, equity foreign bias implies a disproportionate investment of investors domiciled in country on the securities of firms based in country j.
Mishra (2015) and Cooper et al. (2017) provide alternative methods in calculating equity home and foreign bias. Cooper et al. (2017) particularly highlight problems associated with the logratio scale measure which has been used in previous studies (see Chan et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2010) . Following existing studies, the equity foreign bias measure using the freely floated market capitalization adjusted method is shown in equation 6 (see Cooper et al., 2017; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Kho et al., 2009; Mishra and Ratti, 2013) .
where (defined in equation 7) is the investment allocation of investors domiciled in country on equities issued by firms based in country j at time t.
In equations (7) ℎ denotes country 's investors' equity holdings in country at time t. All the 44 countries in our sample data received foreign equity investment, so ℎ ≠ 0. is constructed using the cross-country holding data of CPIS and the EPFR data directly provides the weightings. Hence, there are two proxies of foreign bias. * (in equation 8) is the ICAPM free float or investible benchmark allocation for country j for time t and is defined in equation (8).
is the free float domestic market capitalization of country at time t available to foreign investors . We calculate * using a country's free float market capitalization available to all investors 15 . The use of free float market capitalization helps us to avoid scaling and transforming issues that could be encountered when using log-ratio in the construction of foreign bias. 15 We use MSCI investable market capitalization that is available to all investors, thus avoiding scaling issues in the construction of foreign bias, as in some countries not all equities are freely floated for investments by foreign investors (see Dahlquist et al., 2003) .
In extreme cases, is 1 if investors domiciled in country hold no equities issued by firms based in country j and -1 if investors domiciled in country invest all equities issued by firms based in country j except for its own equities. In our analysis we take the rescaled value of the average equity foreign bias ( ) exhibited by all source country investors (i=1…..n) for country j for each time t as shown in equation (11).
We rescale to 1 − for the sake of comparability and accessible interpretation. This now indicates that value of one is no foreign bias, value greater than one higher investments relative to the benchmark and value less than one lower investments relative to the benchmark. Thus, we should now expect positive relationship between foreign bias and investor protection measures. In subsequent analysis the measure of foreign bias based on CPIS-IMF data is referred to as _ and the measure based on EPFR Global Funds' data is denoted by _ .
Control Variables
We control for a number of factors that are likely to drive the quality of investor protection standard for a given country. These include previous year's market return (Retn_1), market capitalization to GDP ratio (MGDP), turnover ratio (Turn), inflation rate (Infl), trade openness (LSMI), valuation effect (Tobinq), press freedom (Press), political stability (PolStab), and GDP per capita (GDPPC). Brief justification for each control variable is discussed below.
First, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that governance depends on past firm performance, which if persistent, implies that governance and firm performance are linked endogenously via their common dependence on past firm performance. To account for such an effect we include one year lagged stock returns (Retn_1). Retn_1 is calculated as the previous
year's average of monthly returns using MSCI total return index. Second, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development is positively related to the standard of investor protection. We account the role of financial development by using the ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP (MGDP) reflecting the level of stock market development relative to the size of the economy. Third, we incorporate the effect of market liquidity by including the turnover ratio (TURN) defined as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization. We obtain both the stock market development data from WDI.
Fourth, we control for inflation (Infl) to ensure that our analysis is not driven by variations in macroeconomic reforms which may further drive regulatory reforms. We expect inflation to be negatively associated with IPS. Annual inflation rates of each country are sourced from WDI. We employ a press freedom (Press) index controlling the influence of free media and free access to information on the development of investor protection standard. Busse and Gröning (2008) show that countries that allow adequate press freedom have better investor protection and less corruption. A free media with access to information enhances checks and balances on both companies and government activities. Press freedom index takes a value of 0 (lowest degree of press freedom) and 100 (highest degree of press freedom). We expect press freedom to be positively associated with investor protection. We obtain data on press freedom from WGI and use the subcomponents of voice and accountability.
A measure of political stability (PolStab) is used to capture the level of stability in a country. Countries that are politically stable and free from internal/external conflicts are expected to have institutions that can enhance the quality of governance and provide better investor protection. We use PolStab to capture the effect of a stable government on investor protection. We obtained the political stability rating index (0-100) from WGI, the higher value of the index reflecting higher stability. Finally, countries that have a high income level have enough financial resources to establish strong institutions and hold government accountable to provide better investor protection. As such, following Bris and Cabolis (2004) we use GDP per capita (GDPPC) to capture the effect of wealth and economic development on IPS. The data are obtained from WDI.
Empirical Analysis
In this section we report and discuss the results of empirical estimations testing the proposition: whether varying degrees of home and foreign biases in international equity portfolio allocations influence the quality IPS. We begin with a brief examination of the crosscountry summary analysis of key variables, followed by a discussion of multivariate regression estimations. bias may be negatively related to the quality of IPS. The difference in average home bias (CPIS_HB) of the top and bottom ten countries, as two different groups, is -4.30. Similarly, both measures of foreign biases also indicate substantial differences between the two groups.
Cross-sectional Summary
The differences in all four measures of IPS also reveal similar patterns, indicating that the countries with lower (higher) home (foreign) biases are characterised by better IPS.
The country level average values of control variables, presented in 
Bivariate Correlation Analysis

Multivariate Regression
The cross-country summary and correlation analyses discussed in the previous section signify that countries that are characterised with lower home bias seems to be associated with superior IPS. However, whether cross-sectional and temporal variations in home and foreign biases exhibited by equity portfolio investors, in part, may explain the differences in crosscountry IPS, after accounting for the possible factors, remains to be tested. In this section we address this by using country level panel data regressions controlling for country and year fixed effects. We run the regressions using first difference ∆ and ∆ to mitigate the potential issues of any trend/non-stationarity concerns. More specifically, the following general specification (10) is estimated. The results of the four regressions (one for each measure of IPS) are reported in Table   4 . As evident throughout the four specifications (models 1 -4), the coefficients of CPIS_HB enter the regressions with the expected negative sign and are statistically significant. This evidence offers a strong indication of the view that home bias (i.e. the over allocation of portfolio investment in local stock markets) is negatively related to the quality of IPS of a country. These results are consistent with the theoretical assumption of Errunza (2001) who 19 For the sake of brevity we do not report the estimates of year and country fixed effects. investors may lead to improvement in the quality of IPS. As noted earlier these effects may take place through the influence of foreign investors' monitoring effects, and these seeming associations are consistent with the predictions of existing literature (see Errunza, 2001; Huang and Zhu, 2015; Rajan and Zingales, 2000; Stulz, 2005) .
Investor Protection Standards and Equity Home Bias
Investor Protection Standards and Empirical Foreign Bias
Next, we replace the home bias measures with the proxy of foreign bias, as specified in equation (14). In this set of analyses the key explanatory variable of interest is a measure of foreign bias ( _ ) of country in year . The specifications also include all control variables, time fixed effects ( ) and country fixed effects ( ). The estimates of all four specifications are reported in Table 5 . 20 As with any observational empirical investigation, all our estimates in this study are also based on the regular assumption of exogeneity and limited to the sample period we use. Thus, economic interpretation needs to be exercised with due caution. Despite the fact that it is very challenging to fully mitigate the issue of endogeneity, our study does provide strong evidence of the relationship. However, we undertake robustness checks to address endogeneity later in this section.
Consistent with the economic justifications developed earlier, the estimated coefficient of CPIS_FB is positive and statistically significant in all the four models. The coefficient of 0.379 CPIS_FB in model (1) of Table 5 suggests a positive association between the firm-level governance of a country and portfolio allocation of foreign investors. Similarly, models 2, 3
and 4 also exhibit the positive effect of CPIS_FB on measures of IPS. These results offer strong support to the economic conjecture that countries that attract higher level foreign equity portfolio investments, relative to the implied benchmark, are associated with higher levels of corporate governance and regulatory quality, i.e. superior IPS. The findings are also consistent with the implications of the literature discussed earlier (see Errunza, 2001; Stulz, 2005 Table 6 reports the estimates of Equation (15) in which the key variable of interest is GF_FB, a measure of foreign bias in the portfolio of global equity funds of EPFR. As in earlier specifications, all control variables discussed are incorporated, including year effects ( ), and country fixed effects ( ) are also controlled for.
Investor Protection Standards and Global Fund Foreign Bias
Similarly to the results reported in Table 5 , the expected positive and statistical significance of the coefficient of GF_FB (in all four models) implies that the biases observed, even in the international portfolio allocation of global funds, also have important implications for the IPS of host countries. These findings are consistent with the economic justification of On the other hand, countries that are favoured by foreign investors experience improvements in the quality of IPS.
Results of Control Variables
The coefficients of control variables reported in Tables 4-6 Infl is inversely related to investor protection and is generally statistically significant across the specifications. Similarly, PolStab, and Press are positively associated with investor protection but their statistical significance levels are sensitive to alternative specifications. The coefficients of other control variables, such as lagged return (Retn_1) and stock market development (MGDP), are also dependent on the specification of equations, suggesting that they lack a systematic effect on IPS. Not surprisingly, such instability in the role of control variables is also reported by earlier studies such as Lau et al. (2010) and Gelos and Wei (2005) .
Robustness Checks
The results discussed above provide strong evidence that suboptimal international portfolio allocations, i.e. home and foreign biases, seem to have implications for a country's IPS. In this section we present additional tests to validate the robustness of empirical results.
We also address the concern of endogeneity (particularly reverse causality) by examining the relation between IPS and international portfolio allocation using a dynamic Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimation and an exogenous shock based method linked to the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. The results are reported in 
Dynamic GMM Estimation
Although the incorporation of lagged explanatory variables may mitigate the concerns of endogeneity to a certain extent, it may not be enough. We further address this issue by employing the dynamic GMM estimation. Following Hoechle et al. (2012) and Wintoki et al. (2012) we include the first difference of IPS as an internally generated instrumental variable to estimate the first difference dynamic GMM regression (see Arellano and Bover, 1995, for further details of the method). The dynamic GMM estimation is suitable when the time span is smaller and the cross-section of observations is larger. Since our panel dataset includes 15 years of annual observations (time series) for 44 sample countries (cross-section) the dynamic GMM method is empirically appropriate. The model is specified in Equation (16): where IPS is a measure of investor protection standards (one of the four measures of IPS is regressed at a time), ∆ −1 represents the instrumented suboptimal equity portfolio variables 22 For brevity, we do not report the coefficients of control variables but these are available upon request.
(i.e. a measure of bias in international portfolio allocation) and −1 represents the control variables identified earlier.
Panel B (Table 7) reports the coefficients of ∆ −1 ( 2 ) and associated overidentification test results. The coefficients of home and foreign biases are statistically significant with expected signs in all specifications. Thus, the dynamic GMM estimation further adds support to the economic conjecture and our key findings discussed earlier that the prevalence of home bias in equity investors' portfolio deteriorates IPS in the home country whilst higher foreign bias plays a positive role in improving IPS.
Shock Based Test
We further employ a shock based quasi-experiment to separate the exogenous effects of suboptimal allocation by equity investors on IPS. We exploit the exogenous shock created by the 2010 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that led to severe stress in the European markets, particularly for the Eurozone countries. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) show that the crisis affected some Eurozone countries more than others. For instance, in our sample five countries, i.e.
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) suffered a greater decline in their stock markets compared to other euro (non-GIIPS) countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands). Since size of the stock market is related to home and foreign bias measures, we observe the changes in the average measure of suboptimal equity allocations (i.e. home and foreign biases) for the GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries.
In Figures 1 and 2 We use something similar to the difference-in-differences method to examine the effects of home and foreign biases on IPS. To this end we first generated a dummy variable (G t ) that takes the value of one for the GIIPS countries (treated group), and zero for the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries (the control group). Second, a post-crisis year dummy (Post crisis ) to represent the crisis shock from 2011 onwards is also created. Finally, an interactive variable (G t × Post crisis × ) is generated and introduced in Equation (17).
In specification (17) is one of the four measures of IPS discussed earlier and the coefficient of interest is β3. A statistically significant β3, with expected sign (i.e. negative in the case of home bias and positive in the case of foreign bias) should provide a strong indication that changes in IPS of GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries are differently affected by the exogenous changes in home and foreign biases driven by the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis.
The statistical significance and expected signs of 3 coefficients for all four regressions, as reported in Table 7 (panel B), support the view that an increase in home bias seems to weaken a country's IPS. However, a rise in equity foreign bias has a positive impact on country level IPS. These shock based results offer a robust indication that suboptimal international
diversifications by domestic and foreign investors have important implications for the development of IPS.
Conclusions
In spite of extensive evidence on what causes home and foreign biases in international equity portfolio allocation, studies investigating their implications are highly limited.
Economic reasoning implies that financial globalization that promotes optimal international portfolio allocations should help improve the standard of investor protection in host countries.
In a financially open economy domestic and foreign investors should hold optimum levels of equities compatible with the ICAPM benchmark. However, defying the normative suggestions equity investors exhibit different degrees of home and foreign bias in their international portfolio allocation.
This is the first study to empirically examine whether the widely documented home and foreign biases in international portfolio allocation have any implication for investor protection standards (IPS). We examine this issue by analysing a sample of 44 countries spanning 15 years. Consistent with economic justifications, the results suggest that biases in international portfolio allocation carry important implications for the development of IPS. We find that the markets characterised with a higher degree of home bias are associated with poor corporate and state IPS. Similarly, countries that allow for greater participation of foreign portfolio investors (i.e. greater foreign bias) have superior IPS. More specifically, our findings suggest that the quality of IPS in a country improves as domestic and foreign investors undertake optimal international equity portfolio investment. In summary, our findings support the economic conjecture that an optimal financial globalization, as prescribed by the ICAPM, can have a significant positive effect on the IPS of a country. ) and three measures of biases (home and foreign) in international equity portfolio investments for the sample period. Panel A reports the time series averages of each variable for each sample country; averages of developed versus emerging markets using Morgan Stanley Capital Investment classification are presented in Panel B; and averages of the top and bottom ten countries ranked by the CPIS-based measure of home bias (CPIS_HB) are presented in Panel C. Firm_Gov is firm-level corporate governance indexes (column 2); Inv_file is investment profile (column 3); SIPI_WBDB is strength of Investor Protection Index (column 4); and ALT_WBGI is an alternative country level investor protection measure from World Bank Governance Indicators (column 5). All IPS measures are on a scale of 0-100 with higher values indicating higher standards of investor protection and governance. CPIS_HB (column 6) measures equity home bias calculated as the log (natural) value of the share of domestic investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (j) relative to the country's world market capitalization weight (column 6); CPIS_FB is the IMF-CPIS based equity foreign bias measure computed using the world-market-based free float adjusted method by subtracting the average of foreign allocations from foreign investors domiciled in country investing in equities of country j ( ≠ )) from the MSCI investable benchmark allocation for country j (column 7), and GF_FB is also an equity foreign bias measure constructed using EPFR's micro global fund level data (column 8). 
Panel
Table 2 Cross-Country Averages of Control Variables
This table reports the time series average of the control variables for each sample country: Retn_1 is the average MSCI index based total monthly return over the past year; Turn is the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization to market liquidity effects; MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP; Infl is the one year lagged rate of inflation based on the consumer price index; LSMI is market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of the corporate assets of country i; PolStab is the political stability measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater stability; Press is the press freedom indicator measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater freedom from government interference and GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita.
Country
Retn_1 ( ) and 5-7 are the suboptimal international portfolio allocation bias measures. They are described in Table 1 . The other variables include Retn_1 which is the average MSCI index based on total monthly return over the past year; Turn is the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization to market liquidity effects; MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP; Infl is the one year lagged rate of inflation based on the consumer price index; LSMI is market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of corporate assets of country ; PolStab is the political stability measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater stability; Press is the press freedom indicator measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater freedom from government interference and GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita. For brevity and space, statistical significance of at least the 5% level is reported in bold. Table  2 . All variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year level). The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year level). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.
Model (1) Firm_Gov
Model (2) Table 2 . Panel A presents the coefficients estimated using the first difference Dynamic GMM panel model. Panel B presents the shock based estimations, employing the 2010 sovereign debt crisis as the exogenous shock which affected the treatment group of GIIPS Eurozone countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) more than the control group of non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. The tstatistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. Figure 1 shows the annual average home bias measure (i.e. tendency of domestic portfolio investors to over or under allocate their own domestic market relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS euro countries. The objective is to gauge how the GIIPS countries experienced an increase in their home bias compared to non-GIIPS countries during the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 2: Yearly foreign bias in non-GIIPS and GIIPS countries
Notes: Figure 2 shows the annual average foreign bias (i.e. tendency of foreign portfolio investors to over or under allocate a non-resident country relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. The objective is to gauge how the GIIPS countries suffered a decline in their foreign bias proxy compared to non-GIIPS countries during the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. 
